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Research Highlights: 
•Adaptations of SOR tasks allow memory to be assessed by manipulating context. 
•The term context is vaguely defined and broadly applied making comparisons 
difficult. 
•Different neural systems process memory depending on the context being used. 
•Different neural systems process context based memory depending on the question 
being asked. 
•There is an urgent need to clearly define how context is experimentally manipulated. 
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Abstract: 
In recent years, spontaneous recognition tasks have become commonplace methods 
of assessing memory in animals. Adaptations of these tasks allow us to look at the 
role of objects, contexts and spatial locations in memory. Recent findings have 
highlighted that not all types of contexts in these tasks rely on the same neural 
systems. Similarly, asking different questions about the same types of context can 
allow the dissociation of neural systems underlying these memories. Here we review 
the current position in how context is used in such tasks, and we consider the 
fundamental importance of clearly defining both the nature of the context being used, 
and the questions asked of it in order to fully appreciate the neural and cognitive 
mechanisms being studied in such tasks. 
 
  
Introduction 
 
In recent years, spontaneous tasks of recognition memory in rodents have become a 
widely used tool for understanding the neural basis of memory. These tasks build on 
the work of Berlyne[1], in the 1950s who showed that rats preferred to explore novel 
objects with reduced exploration of the objects on subsequent exposures, reflecting 
a degree of habituation or familiarisation with the objects. Later work by Ennaceur 
and Delacour [2], utilised this finding to develop an easy to administer task of 
memory that does not require animals to learn specific performance rules in order to 
complete the task. In this spontaneous object recognition (SOR) task, the animals 
are first exposed to two copies of the same object in a sample phase. They are given 
time to explore these objects and familiarise themselves to them. Then, after some 
variable delay period, a test is administered in which they are presented, in the same 
environment, to another copy of the previously seen item alongside a completely 
novel object. If the animals are able to remember the previous sample event then 
they will be able to identify the previously seen object as familiar, and hence will 
have a preference for exploring the novel object. This preference is measured 
through exploration time of the objects, with the most common measure of 
performance being a discrimination ratio that accounts for individual variations in an 
animal’s overall levels of exploration [(time exploring novel item − time exploring 
familiar item)/(time exploring novel + familiar items)]. 
 
The SOR task has become increasingly popular in recent years because alternative 
tasks of recognition memory (such as delayed match to sample) require a rule to be 
learnt prior to the task, and for that rule to be applied to demonstrate memory. As 
such, any impairments might not be in recognition memory per se, but in either the 
learning or application of such rules. However, whilst the SOR task does not suffer 
from this problem there are other issues (such as stress induced by multiple 
instances of handling) that can influence behaviour on the task (such issues, for 
example, may result in a degree of neophobia). The result of these influences on a 
spontaneous task is large amounts of variance in the data; animals typically run one 
trial (sample and test) a day and the behaviour of individuals can be highly variable. 
Therefore, the task typically requires large numbers of animals to produce sufficient 
statistical power, and this can, at times, mask the effects of manipulations on 
memory (see Ennaceur [3], for a review). However, in recent years some of these 
issues have been overcome. Building on the work of Albasser et al. [4], we have 
developed a new continual trials apparatus [5] that allows the animals to complete 
the SOR task without any within-session handling. Rather than taking animals in and 
out of the arena between sample and test (inducing stress, and therefore affecting 
spontaneous behaviour), the animals are trained to return to an external starting 
point themselves at the end of the exploratory period. This not only allows a single 
trial to be run without handling, but actually allows the animal to run multiple trials 
within a single day’s session. Reduced handling and increased number of trials 
combined together means that SOR tasks run in the continual trials apparatus have 
greater reliability, and can show the same level of statistical power with a near 50% 
reduction in animal numbers [5]. 
 
The SOR task can also be adapted to understand more than just recognition 
memory for objects. Standard variations of the task can include testing memory for 
locations (two copies of an object at sample, one of which is found in a novel location 
at test) [6,7]. In addition, memory can be tested for combinations of features. For 
example, object-location memory can be tested by having two different objects (e.g. 
A and B) in two locations (e.g. left and right) at sample, and then two copies of one 
of those objects (e.g. A) in both the locations at test. Here the novelty is defined not 
by novelty of the object or the novelty of the filled location but by the novelty that a 
particular object has not been seen in that particular location before. The memory is 
once again displayed through spontaneous preference for exploring the novel 
combination of object and location [8]. 
 
Like the simple object recognition task, this task can also be used in the continual 
trials apparatus [5] to improve reliability. Similarly, memory for the combination of 
object and context can be tested [7]. In this task (see Fig. 1), two copies of a single 
object (e.g. A) are presented in an arena with particular visual and tactile 
features(e.g. Context X) in one sample event. In a second sample, two copies of a 
different object (e.g. Object B) are presented in an arena with different visual and 
tactile features forming a different context (e.g. Context Y). At test the animal returns 
to one of the contexts (e.g. Context X) with one copy of each of the previously seen 
objects (A and B). In this situation, object A has been seen in this context previously, 
whilst object B has not. The combination of object B in context X is novel, and 
recognition of this is expressed by the animal through preferential exploration of 
object B in this context. Once again, this type of recognition memory can be tested in 
the continual trials apparatus [5].  
 
Memory for combinations of features can be taken one step further by asking 
animals to show their memory for combinations of three features, object, location 
and context together [9]. In this task (see lower panel in Fig. 1), the first sample 
event has two objects (e.g. A and B) placed in two locations (e.g. left and right) in a 
context (e.g. context X) defined by visual and tactile features. After exploring this 
sample event, the animal is given a brief delay outside of the apparatus before being 
returned to another context (context Y). Now the same objects (A and B) are 
presented again, but in opposite locations (i.e. if A was on the left in X, it is on the 
right in Y). Once again the animals explore this sample event. Following a variable 
delay, animals are then returned at test to one of these contexts (e.g. context X) and 
now there are two copies of one of the previously seen objects (e.g. A) in each of the 
previously filled locations. Now the only novelty present is the combination (in this 
particular example) of object A on the right in context X. Object A has been seen in 
context X before, and has been seen on the right before, but never on the right in 
context X. This task is of particular interest as the combination of object, location and 
context has been argued to be an operationalisation of episodic memory, with 
animals showing memory for what (object) happened, where (location) on which 
occasion (context) [10]. 
 
The nature of context 
 
The ability to manipulate context in SOR tasks highlights its potential importance. By 
defining context as part of a memory, for example, we are able to explore episodic 
memory within animals (reviewed in [10]). However, in order to fully understand the 
processes involved in such memory tasks, we need to be clear about the nature of 
the features of the memory being used. In this case, clearly understanding the nature 
of the stimulus being defined as the context is required. From an associative learning 
perspective, con-textual representations can be described as the binding together 
and integration of various elements of sensory information [11]. However, contexts 
are not merely a gathering of sensory information; pre-exposure to each individual 
element of a context is not enough to create contextual conditioning. Exposure to a 
whole context is required to form a representation [12] suggesting that contexts are 
an integrated representation of various components of available sensory information. 
 
Use of context in human experiments 
 
In human memory research, the term context is a broadly applied and vaguely 
defined concept. In the broadest sense, context can refer to all residual incidental 
information encoded when an item is taken into memory. This contextual, or other, 
information may or may not be useful during retrieval. Manipulating context 
experimentally can mean a variety of things: the physical, spatial–temporal, 
environmental, physiological or emotional state in which an item was encoded into 
memory [13]. Godden and Baddeley [14], showed that items on a word list were 
better remembered when tested in the same context that learning took place in. In 
this experiment, context referred to the physical environment: on land or underwater. 
In associative learning terms, context has been described as a strengthening 
operator when items on a word list are recalled in similar circumstances to how they 
were learned. Here, context refers to the level of semantic processing required 
during encoding: deep verses shallow [15]. Context can also refer to a variety of 
sensory processes occurring at the time of encoding. Context can refer to: auditory 
stimuli (background music, see [16,17]; a specific voice, [18]; olfaction (incidental 
odour-context cues in tests of free-recall, see [19]), vision (background scenes, see 
[20,21]); complex picture discriminations [22]; colour, [18] or even mood [23] and 
mental state [24]. Context can also refer to processing spatial information [25], or the 
social context in which items are encoded [26]. 
 
In both the human and the animal literature, manipulating context can refer to 
concrete aspects of the physical and visual environment. Equally, context can refer 
to more abstract components, including altering task demands or sensory 
information such as odour or auditory cues. Whether or not context contributes to 
animal memory analogous to contextual contributions to human memory is difficult to 
determine. What is known is that context contributes to memory, specifically episodic 
memory (for discussion, see [27,28]). 
The distinction between these multiple types of context is critical in understanding 
the neural basis of the memories being tested in the rodent SOR tasks described 
earlier. For example, as well as the episodic what-where-which (WWWhich; object-
location-context) task described above [9], other groups have used an alternative 
SOR task to assess episodic memory in rodents, namely what-where-when 
(WWWhen; object-location-time) [29,30]. Here, then, are two different episodic tasks 
in rodents, both utilising the spontaneous recognition paradigm by combining 
features to assess an animal’s memory of a unique and individually experienced 
event. In both cases, events are differentiated by contextual information, but the 
nature of this information is different in each case. In the WWWhich task, the context 
defining an occasion is described by visual and tactile elements of an arena in which 
the event happens. In the WWWhen task, the context is defined as a temporal 
context (i.e. the event happened first or second, earlier or more recently, etc.). 
Although these contextual cues are very clearly different between the two tasks, one 
might expect them both to utilise episodic memory, and therefore rely on the same 
neural systems. Indeed, both the WWWhich task [9,31] and the WWWhen task 
[29,30] are similarly dependent upon the hippocampal system.  
 
Three decades after Tulving (1983) redefined the concept of episodic memory, 
subjective experience, a critical component of episodic processes in humans, has 
remained a contentious point when drawing comparisons between rodent and 
human research findings. However, as outlined above, the neural basis of memory 
has been widely and effectively studied in rodents by examining the components of 
episodic memory in such tasks as WWWhich and WWWhen, where the focus is on 
the content (rather than the experience) of the memory. However, it appears that the 
neural systems for these two episodic tasks can be dissociated. In mice with an age-
dependent pathology modelling Alzheimer’s disease, the WWWhich task is impaired 
at the age of 6 months when pathology is confined to the medial temporal lobe, 
whilst the WWWhen task remains unimpaired at 12 months, even when the 
pathology has spread beyond this region [32]. This dissociation is not unique to 
rodent SOR tasks. When humans were asked questions similar to those presented 
in rodent versions of the tasks, it was possible to address the participants’ 
phenomenological experience by asking them to attribute their response to the 
process of either recollection or familiarity whilst also quantifying participants’ 
accuracy. The WWWhich task could only be solved by recollection (implying it is a 
task of episodic memory) whilst the WWWhen task could also be solved by 
familiarity-based mechanisms, suggesting it does not require episodic memory for 
accurate performance [33]. These results show that tasks ostensibly measuring the 
same cognitive process (episodic memory) can differ in terms of both cognitive and 
neural mechanism when the difference between them is the way in which a unique 
occasion is identified, either contextually in WWWhich or by how recently it was 
experienced in WWWhen. Another apparent distinction in the way in which types of 
con-text influence the neural mechanisms involved in memory can be seen in studies 
of the role of acetylcholine in memory using contextual information. Despite the fact 
that lesions to the hippocampus severely impair the episodic WWWhich task in rats 
[9,34] when immunotoxic lesions of the cholinergic input to the hippocampus are 
made, rats show no impairment at all on the task [35]. Thus, whilst this task is clearly 
dependent upon the hippocampus [9], it is not dependent upon the cholinergic input 
to the hippocampus. However, the WWWhich task in rats is closely related to 
another task of episodic memory, this time one that has been used with monkeys. By 
combining various objects, locations and unique backgrounds, Gaffan [36] created 
scenes which he argued make up integrated ‘snapshots’ that represent episodic 
memory. In this experiment, the monkeys learned a two-choice visual discrimination 
(i.e. which of two objects presented in a problem is rewarded), but these objects 
were in problem-unique fixed locations against problem-unique backgrounds 
integrated to create a contextual backdrop for the memory, i.e. every time a visual 
discrimination problem was seen, the same objects were in the same location 
against the same background. Good performance in this task in monkeys is also 
reliant on the hippocampal system [36], but in contrast to the WWWhich task in rats, 
it is also dependent on the cholinergic input to the hippocampus and temporal cortex 
[37]. Here, then, there are two similar tasks, one requiring rats to explore and 
recognise objects in fixed locations and where features of the environment define the 
occasion being remembered, and one where monkeys scan a ‘snapshot’ scene and 
learn the reward contingencies of objects in particular locations on those 
backgrounds. Both these tasks rely on the hippocampus, but the involvement of 
cholinergic inputs to the hippocampus differentiates them. These seemingly discrete 
differences highlight the process-dependent nature of episodic memory. When the 
task components remain the same (objects in particular locations, nested in a 
specific occasion), but the task demands are altered (e.g. exploration of object for 
rats, scanning scenes in monkeys), the reliance on cholinergic projections to the 
hippocampus varies despite both tasks addressing WWWhich questions.  
 
Taken together, these results suggest that the process of episodic memory is an 
integrative one requiring the component parts of the what-where-which task to form a 
unified memory of a single event. Where WWWhen tasks have been seen to be 
unimpaired in AD mice, whilst WWWhich is impaired [32] and where WWWhen has 
been seen to be solvable through familiarity-based mechanisms [33], it has been 
proposed that this is a result of not having a unified memory of the event. Rather, it 
was proposed [33] that a familiarity based (non-episodic) solution was available 
through (for example) having a sense of familiarity over what happened and where, 
and combining that with a relative sense of memory strength to judge how recently it 
had occurred. This combined What-Where and When memory is distinct from a 
single, unified WWWhen representation. However, it remains true that although the 
WWWhen tasks in these studies did not require episodic memory, episodic memory 
was, nonetheless, available. One question that remains unanswered is why, if 
episodic memory is available, it isn’t used to solve these non-episodic tasks. 
Episodic memory can be used, after all, in even the simplest object recognition task 
[e.g. 33]. Addressing this question explains precisely why SOR tasks are so effective 
in the study of episodic memory. When presented with an SOR task, learning is 
entirely incidental and capitalises on the animals’ natural curiosity. There is no food 
reward to drive the learning of a strategy to solve the task. As a result, the ability to 
flexibly apply the incidentally learned information (whether it be contextual, sensory, 
visual, tactile, etc), to recollect an event is what makes a task episodic.  
 
Whilst lesion studies can help differentiate the relative involvement of various medial 
temporal lobe structures in behavioural tasks with differing contextual cues [32] and 
behavioural demands [9 versus 38; 35], dissociations of representations of different 
types of context can also be seen in single-cell recording studies. By integrating 
spatial information, place cells in the hippocampus are thought to build an internal 
map of an environment [39]. It is supposed that these representations are mediated 
by the environmental context, with place fields of an individual neuron remapping 
when moving from one environmental context to another [40–42].The control of this 
remapping by the environmental context is relatively well understood, but recent 
work suggests once again that the nature of the contextual stimuli is important. 
Spiers et al. [43] recorded place fields from hippocampal cells whilst animals 
explored a maze with multiple rooms leading from a common corridor. When extra-
maze cues were removed and the visual and tactile properties of the different rooms 
were kept identical, the place fields of some cells within the hippocampus failed to 
remap when the animal moved from one room to another. However, when one of the 
rooms was identified not only by its position along the corridor, but also by a visually 
and tactily distinctive context, the place fields remapped when the animal entered 
this room, whilst continuing to represent the other rooms in an identical manner. This 
is a surprising finding as it seems unlikely that identical rooms along a corridor 
disorientate the animals so much that they cannot distinguish one from another. 
Rather than the visual and tactile contextual cues, other contextual cues will help 
animals to differentiate where they are in such an environment, such as entry point 
along the corridor, or sounds from the room, or smells in the environment, or 
locomotor activity over the time in the apparatus. However, these contextual cues 
seem influence the firing rate of place cells in a very different way to more 
‘traditional’ contextual cues. The location of the place field appears to be strongly 
influenced by the typical visual and tactile contextual cues, but less so by these less 
clearly identifiable contextual cues. It cannot be claimed that no remapping of place 
fields occurs within these cells when the rooms are identical as it remains a 
possibility that there is, for example, rate remapping or that the network remaps 
whilst some individual place fields do not. Nonetheless the effect of different types of 
contextual information on the activity of place cells seems clear. 
 
Differential use of the same context 
 
To this point we have discussed how the use of different types of context can clearly 
differentiate both the cognitive and neural mechanisms at play in memory involving 
those contexts. However, it also appears true that different neural mechanisms 
underlie memory using the same type of context when the question being asked 
about that contextual information is different. The clearest example of this can be 
seen in a series of studies by Eacott and Norman [9,38]. In these studies, a range of 
SOR tasks were used, including two that utlilised context in the form of visual and 
tactile environments in which objects were presented. These tasks were either 
object-context (What-Which) or object-location-context (WWWhich; episodic 
memory). Both tasks required the animals to experience two sample events and a 
test, and each required animals to explore objects within particular contexts (see Fig. 
1). However, the effect of lesions to the fornix or postrhinal cortex on these tasks 
could be doubly dissociated [38]. Lesions to the postrhinal cortex led to significantly 
impaired performance on the What-Which task [38], but spared performance on the 
WWWhich task [9]. In contrast, lesions to the fornix severely impaired WWWhich 
performance, whilst What-Which performance was relatively intact.  
 
What is surprising about the results of Eacott and Norman [9,38],is that the 
postrhinal cortex is considered to be the anatomical route to the hippocampus for 
contextual information [see 44 for review].It is not, therefore, surprising that the 
postrhinal-lesioned animals are impaired at the object-context task [38], but it is 
surprising that the same animals are unimpaired at the WWWhich task [9]. For the 
WWWhich task, animals must still access information about the context of an event. 
This information must enter the hippocampus as animals with lesions of the fornix 
are impaired at this task [9],a finding confirmed when selective bilateral hippocampal 
lesions produced a similar pattern of impairments [31]. However, it seems that the 
route of this contextual information into the hippocampus is independent of the 
postrhinal cortex. There are numerous possible explanations for this, such as cross-
over of information between post-rhinal and perirhinal cortex [44] and different neural 
systems in cortex and hippocampus for processing context [45,46].However, neither 
of these possibilities can explain the double dissociation of function between post-
rhinal cortex and hippocampus in these SOR tasks. In both cases the context is the 
same: an arena with visual and tactile information present. If the information could be 
processed via perirhinal cortex for the WWWhich task, then why can it not be 
processed in that way for the object-context task? Similarly, if it is that the context 
used is tapping into either the hippocampal context system or the cortical context 
system, then why are different tasks using the same type of context impaired 
differently by lesions to these two systems?  
 
An alternative possibility was discussed by Eacott and Gaffan [47]. In this 
explanation, it is not the nature of the context that should differentiate the neural 
system on which each task relies, but rather the nature of the question being asked. 
The WWWhich task is designed as an episodic task, based around Clayton and 
Dickinson’s operationalisation of episodic memory (as what happened, where and 
when, [48]) and substituting which occasion for when something happened. In the 
object-context task, the animal is recognising a novel combination of object and 
context (where each is a separate and dissociable component of the memory) 
[9,10,38].However, for the WWWhich task (as with episodic memory in humans) the 
memory is not the sum of the memory for the three components. Rather, the memory 
is a unitary memory of a single event [49,50]. Because of this difference, the 
WWWhich is an episodic task, and the object-context task is not. As a result, the 
WWWhich task is expected to rely on recollection (as does episodic memory) whilst 
the non-episodic object-context task could be solved using familiarity-based memory 
processes [32,33]. It is this difference in process that determines the neural 
substrates of memory. Although both tasks ask animals to remember information 
within the same type of contexts the WWWhich task requires recollection, and is 
dependent upon the hippocampus. In contrast, the context information processed in 
the post-rhinal cortex is sufficient to support familiarity-based memory, but not 
recollection-based memory [47]. 
 
Even within the hippocampus there are dissociations between tasks using the same 
type of contextual information. Animals with depletion of the cholinergic input to the 
hippocampus are unimpaired on the WWWhich task, but the same animals are 
impaired at a location-context (Where-Which) task [51]. Once again, in each case, 
the contexts being used are the same (visually and tactily distinct walls and floors in 
an open arena), but the effect of lesions is different depending on the nature of the 
question being asked. This supports the view that even though different types of con-
text may themselves rely on different neural systems when being used to ask the 
same question (consider WWWhich and WWWhen [32,33], discussed above), it is 
also true that the same type of context is processed by different neural systems 
when being used indifferent types of behavioural tasks when different questions are 
asked of the animal. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The evidence supports the literature from human studies that there are many and 
varied types of context in animal memory. Defining such a ubiquitous term as context 
is difficult, although many have tried. One clear definition comes from a review by 
Rudy [12] in which he considers context to have two well defined properties: 
‘stability’ (they must be independent of the observer, i.e. in the absence of the 
observer, the relationship between features, and their meaning, remains the same) 
and be subject to ‘component variation’ (i.e. the component features of the context 
must be able to be rearranged in relation to one another to create new contexts). 
However, we would propose that even such clear definitions such as these are 
unhelpful in understanding what part context plays within encoding and retrieving a 
memory. The data discussed here shows clearly that what context is, how it is used 
and what systems it relies on, depends on a variety of issues. However, in relating 
these tasks to human memory, there are a number of additional issues to be 
addressed. As discussed earlier, context in tasks of memory in humans is often 
equally poorly described, but in addition to the issues discussed above, we also have 
to consider semantic associations. For example, in Rudy’s [12]examples of well-
defined context, he describes how component variation might include the movement 
or replacement of items in an office, and that with numerous such replacements, a 
new context is established (although, as he points out, the point at which these 
substitutions are dealt with as a new context itself needs to be the subject of 
empirical study). However, we also have many semantic associations with contexts 
around us, and these can be independent of the relationships of features within 
those contexts (e.g. my office is always ‘my office’ whether or not my chair is in its 
usual location, or a novel one). These semantic associations with context are 
complex, can develop over a lifetime and are complicated by additional associations 
brought by language use. It is worth establishing that in the SOR tasks described 
here, the tasks are always carried out in highly familiar contexts (i.e. contexts to 
which the animals have been habituated over many days). Indeed, it is possible that 
some of the complexities of context in human memory can be more fully understood 
in animals, where the lifetime experience of the animal can be carefully controlled, 
and therefore the familiarity with, and associations made, to the context in which the 
tasks are run can be differentiated.  
 
Nonetheless, for work in animals and humans we make the case that there is an 
urgent need to carefully define the contexts being used. This goes beyond merely 
defining what a context may or may not be, but rather extends to being clear both the 
nature of the context and how it is being used much in the way any other procedural 
demands of a task would be empirically reported. Both these issues can clearly 
determine the neural basis of the memory being studied, and need to be explicitly 
considered when interpreting the literature. 
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Figure Legends: 
Figure 1 
Two spontaneous object recognition tasks used to double dissociate the effects of 
lesions to the fornix or postrhinal cortex. Upper panel: Performance on a what-which 
(object-context) task was impaired by posthrinal lesions but not lesions to the fornix 
(Norman and Eacott, 2005). Lower panel: Performance on a what-where-
which(wwwhich; episodic memory) task was impaired by fornix lesions but not 
postrhinal lesions (Eacott and Norman, 2004). 
